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II. ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Ms. Lovely slated the issue on appeal thus: 
Did the court err by denying the motion to suppress because the automobile 
exception did not apply to the checked and stowed luggage of Ms. Lovely, as the 
bus was not readily movable by Ms. Lovely and she retained a reasonable 
expectation that her luggage would not be opened and searched by the police? 
In its brief, the Respondent misstates the issue as whether Ms. Lovely's "argument that the 
automobile exception did not apply to the bus because she could not personally drive it without 
merit?" Respondent's Brief, pg. 3. Ms. Lovely states the issue in reply as "has the state met its 
burden of proving an exception to the warrant requirement existed in this case?" 
III. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Arguments are Not Waived 
The State first argues that Ms. Lovely's argument that the automobile exception does not 
apply to checked luggage stowed on a Greyhound Bus has been waived under State v. Zincho, 
129 Idaho 259, 923 P.3d 966 (1996), because "[s]he cites no case for this proposition[.]" 
Respondent's Brief, pg. 6. Zincho, however, does not require that Ms. Lovely cite an on-point 
case in order to present her argument on appeal. The rule in Zinc ho is that "[ w ]hen issues on 
appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or argument, they will not be 
considered." 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.3d at 970. The Court's later reference to "authority or 
argument" conflates "propositions oflaw and authority." The state's reading of the case to 
require a citation to a case where the automobile exception was not applied to a bus is unsound 
because, as Ms. Lovely has noted, "there is no Idaho or United States Supreme Court case which 
addresses the applicability of the automobile exception to checked luggage on a bus." Opening 
Brie( pg. 7. If Zincho required citation to on-point authority, cases of first impression could 
never be raised on appeal, a manifestly absurd result. 
Ms. Lovely cited propositions of law, provided citations to authority for them, and argued 
why those propositions oflaw did not justify application of the automobile exception in this case. 
For example, Ms. Lovely cited authority for the proposition of law that warrantless searches and 
seizures are per se unreasonable unless they come within one of the few specifically established 
and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. See e.g., State v. Schmadeka, 136 
Idaho 595, 598, 38 P.3d 633,636 (Ct. App. 2001). She noted that there was no Idaho or United 
States Supreme Court case applying the automobile exception to similar facts. She cited 
Cal[fornia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991 ), and noted that the automobile exception is 
based both upon the automobile's ready mobility and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an 
automobile as compared to the privacy interest in a home. Id. She then argued that those 
justifications for the exception did not apply with the same force to checked luggage found 
within the baggage compartment of a bus because the bus was not readily mobile to Ms. Lovely. 
Also, commercial buses are not fully mobile in the way automobiles are because buses follow 
fixed routes and schedules. In addition, Greyhound passengers do "not have access to checked 
baggage during [their] trip" as do passengers in private vehicles. State's Exhibit 5. She also 
argued that she still had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her checked bags, citing Bond v. 
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United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000), a case involving carry-on luggage on a bus. 
Ms. Lovely cited authority that the state bore the burden of proving that an exception to 
the warrant requirement was established. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 
(1995). She also argued that the state had not met that burden. Reading Zincho to require Ms. 
Lovely to prove a negative - the absence of an exception to the warrant requirement - would turn 
the requirement that the state prove the existence of such an exception on its head. 
Likewise, Ms. Lovely's argument that the state could have obtained a warrant under the 
facts of the case was not waived. It was supported by both argument (regarding the practical 
availability of a warrant) and authority that a warrant is required except where there are exigent 
circumstances, such as in the case of a vehicle which can be quickly moved out of the locality or 
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569. She 
argued that the exigent circumstances which justify the automobile exception do not apply with 
the same force in this case and do not justify the application of the exception here. 
In light of the above, the Court should find that Ms. Lovely's arguments have not been 
waived. 
B. The State Has Not Established the Existence of an Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement. 
While the state chastises Ms. Lovely's counsel for allowing supposed "relevant authority" 
to go "uncited," it fails to cite to a single case where the automobile exception has been applied 
to a search of checked and stowed luggage on a bus. Ms. Lovely does not have to prove the 
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absence of an exception, it is the state which bears the burden of establishing an exception to the 
general requirement of a warrant. State v. Schmadeka, supra. 
Moreover, the state's claimed "relevant authority" is not. First, its reliance upon State v. 
Gosch, 157 ldaho 803,339 P.3d 1207 (Ct. App. 2014), is misplaced because that case involved a 
private vehicle parked in a residential driveway. While the Court held the automobile exception 
applied there because the car was presumably mobile, that case has nothing in common with the 
facts here. Further, the cases cited by the state for the proposition that a passenger's belongings 
within a private vehicle may be searched under the automobile exception, see e.g., Wyoming v. 
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), are not applicable here because the automobile exception does 
not apply to these facts. The same is true for the state's citation to automobile exception cases 
which hold it is irrelevant whether a search warrant could have been obtained. See e.g., 
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465,467 (1999). Both Houghton and Dyson are cases where the 
automobile exception applied and the question presented on appeal dealt with the scope of the 
exception. Here, however, the state has failed to prove the automobile exception applies. Since 
the state has not even established that the automobile exception applies it is beside the point that 
the search did not violate the scope of that exception. The point is the police did not obtain a 
warrant and no exception to the warrant requirement has been proven. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
the reasons set forth above and in the Opening Brie[ Lori Lovely asks this Court to 
reverse the order denying her motion to suppress evidence, vacate her conviction, and remand to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
-,,,... 
Respectfully submitted this2 4 day of September, 2015. 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Lori Lovely 
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